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In this issue of Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, two
rticles revisit a pair of seminal models that have permeated devel-
pmental neuroscience research focused on adolescence. Shulman
nd colleagues (2016) “review, reappraise, and reafﬁrm” research
elevant to dual-systems models of adolescent development, while
elson and colleagues (2016) “expand and update” their proposal
egarding the social reorientation model of adolescence and its
nderlying neural circuitry. The present commentary aims to com-
lement these efforts with a constructive critique that leads to
oncrete steps we believe can, and should, be taken to improve our
odels and maximize cumulative scientiﬁc progress in the ﬁeld.
e  propose here that for adolescent developmental neuroscience
o be truly meaningful – and by this we mean precise enough to
ot only make accurate and testable research predictions, but also
e translatable into prevention, intervention, and policy programs
hat will signiﬁcantly improve developmental outcomes for adoles-
ents – we need to refocus our priorities and enable our scientiﬁc
odels to evolve.
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/).Nearly two decades ago, Eysenck (1997) described the range of
scientiﬁc methodologies appropriate to different stages of psycho-
logical research:
“Science begins with a hunch, acquired through observation
and induction, which is clearly a preparadigmatic position.
If the hunch seems to work, psychologists construct small-
scale hypotheses, for which they seek veriﬁcation. If such
veriﬁcation is forthcoming in sufﬁcient quantity, the level of
theory is reached, and one may  then consider the demands of
falsiﬁcation. . . The point between hypothesis and theory would
seem to mark the advent of a paradigm.  . . when the ordinary
business of science takes over, that is, the large-scale testing of
deductions from the theory, and the attempt to explain anoma-
lies in terms of the theory’s apparent failure” (pp. 1225–1226).
We believe that many of our models in adolescent developmental
neuroscience, and the resultant research, are persisting in a ver-
iﬁcation stage, where we  primarily focus on supportive evidence
that is consistent with the model in question. Indeed, the task is
so complex that this is no small achievement, and it is not surpris-
ing that the ﬁeld registers some satisfaction at having models that
explain a wide range of phenomena. However, greater progress will
be achieved if we progress to a more falsiﬁcation oriented approach,
where we (i) rigorously examine and account for inconsistent evi-
dence, and (ii) put our models at strong risk of falsiﬁcation based
on more precise predictions.
A precise prediction that is supported by data provides much
stronger evidence for a model than does a less precise prediction.
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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n other words, the degree of logical support for a model is greater
iven the rarity of the observation absent the theory – what Salmon
1984) has called a “damn strange coincidence” and Meehl (1978)
as referred to as a “risky prediction.” The importance of this kind
f precision goes beyond scientiﬁc progress and model building
although that is reason enough). One of the great challenges that
ur ﬁeld, along with many others, struggles with is ﬁnding strong
ranslational applications of our work – ones that can really have an
mpact at both the population and individual level (Allen and Dahl,
015). However, for this admittedly lofty goal to ever be achieved
e have to have models that make predictions that are sufﬁciently
recise and robust that we can prescribe public policy and clinical
nnovations that have real impact.
We are well aware that is much easier to sit on the sidelines and
ncourage others to do better than it is develop models and put
hem to the test. We  have had our own attempts at theorizing and
uilding models, with varying degrees of success, and we  know that
t is hard and exacting work (e.g., Allen and Badcock, 2003; Davey
t al., 2008; Pfeifer and Peake, 2012). In this respect we would like
o make it unambiguous that the work represented in the target
rticles is a brave and necessary part of the scientiﬁc process. The
uthors and their ideas have our respect and admiration. Also, it is
air to note that we are not proposing an alternative model here, but
e do believe that the approach we describe herein is important
n addition to, and support of, the process of model building and
eﬁnement.
. A precision approach for adolescent developmental
euroscience: PECANS
In recent years, a number of reviews surveying the evidence
egarding inﬂuential models of adolescent brain and behavioral
evelopment (Pfeifer and Allen, 2012; and others, e.g., Bjork et al.,
012; Crone and Dahl, 2012; Telzer, 2016) have noted sets of
ndings that do not conform to model predictions. It is tempting
or supporters of these models to push these inconsistencies to the
ide, and for both sides to create a qualitative “box-score tally” of
tudies that do or do not provide support. For example, Shulman
nd colleagues (2016) list nine articles that show adolescents
ngage the striatum to a greater extent than both children and
dults, four articles that ﬁnd the opposite pattern, and four more
hat fail to demonstrate any age differences (p. 20). As is common
n qualitative reviews, this list is then summarized as revealing
considerable evidence” in support of dual-systems models, while
 “handful of studies” ﬁnd the opposite pattern or no differences
hatsoever. They then go on to explain this inconsistency in
erms of separating out reward anticipation from receipt – three
f those nine supporting studies are listed to demonstrate that
dolescents engage the striatum “consistently” more than adults
uring reward receipt. Meanwhile, they suggest there is a tendency
o see increased striatum during anticipation only when the cue
eliably predicts greater likelihood of reward (referencing two
tudies that observe this, and two that do not).
Regardless of whether such lists generated by qualitative
eviews (including both the Shulman and Nelson papers in this
ssue, but deﬁnitely not limited to them) are intended to be com-
rehensive or illustrative, we propose that it is well past time for
s all to move beyond qualitative box-score tallies, and engage in
ore precise assessment of how robustly the evidence supports
r contradicts the models. A recently published quantitative meta-
nalysis (Silverman et al., 2015) observed that across 26 studies,
dolescents activated a number of regions more than adults during
eward processing, including ventral and dorsal striatum, insula,
mygdala, anterior and posterior cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal
ortex, and frontal poles. This is an essential step away fromFig. 1. The PECANS checklist, a mnemonic to enhance precision in adolescent devel-
opmental neuroscience.
box-score tallies. We  applaud this work and will be the ﬁrst to note
that this kind of an assessment is much stronger and more satisfy-
ing, even in terms of verifying dual-systems or imbalance models.
However, Meehl (1997) suggested that ideally, model assessment
will be inﬂuenced by both the precision of prediction and extent to
which observed data are close to those predictions.
As we have written about previously (Pfeifer and Allen, 2012),
dual-systems and imbalance models in particular are applied so
widely that they can be (and are) used to explain the vast major-
ity of adverse outcomes in adolescence (and beyond; e.g., risk
taking, anxiety, depression, violence, substance abuse, borderline
personality, and indeed adolescence itself). Theories that include
description of speciﬁc social brain systems, such as those of Nel-
son and colleagues (2016), have been less susceptible to this type
of indiscriminant application – not because they are inherently
less vulnerable to it, but mainly because to date there has been
signiﬁcantly less speciﬁc research informed by the predictions of
these models. We  suspect that as research interest in this sub-
ﬁeld continues to intensify, the social reorientation model and
other similar theories will rapidly face similar challenges in speci-
ﬁcity. This is foreshadowed by the efforts of Nelson and colleagues
(2016) to expand the social reorientation model beyond adoles-
cence, and illustrate potential tension between deep precision and
broad application just as experienced in previous years by dual-
systems and related models.
In addition to a lack of precision in the applications of these
models, there is a corresponding lack of audacity in the ways we
(ourselves included) have tested these models. For a ﬁeld so con-
cerned about adolescent risk, we all have played it remarkably safe!
There are many contributing factors to our collective risk aver-
sion, not least of which include the need in new areas of study
to build foundational knowledge bases from which to turn our
hunches into hypotheses (as described by Eysenck, 1997), as well as
the expense and difﬁculty of conducting adolescent developmental
neuroscience research, particularly longitudinal and ecologically
valid assessments. As such, we suggest that the ﬁeld will be best
served by taking the following concrete steps towards “auda-
cious speciﬁcity” in the following domains (see Fig. 1): Prediction,
Experimental Design, Communication, Adolescence (Developmen-
tally Meaningful Indicators), Neural Inferences, and Signiﬁcance
(Ecological and/or Translational Outcomes).
Precision in the ﬁrst three areas (prediction, experimental
design, and communication) is simply good scientiﬁc practice
across disciplines. Additionally, accomplishing precision in these
areas also requires precision in the last three areas (adolescent
development, neural inferences, and signiﬁcant outcomes) that are
more particular to the ﬁeld. In many cases, issues that are presented
below with respect to one area actually contribute to others as
well. Together, these six keywords provide a guiding mnemonic,
following in the tradition of utilizing the PICO checklist to guide
evidence-based medicine, which has been credited with improving
both research practice and research synthesis through systematic
reviews and meta-analyses. (The PICO checklist is a method used
to frame and answer a clinical question – the mnemonic stands for
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atient, problem or population,  Intervention, Comparison, control or
omparator, and Outcomes; Straus et al., 2004). In the following sec-
ions, we brieﬂy outline each facet of the PECANS checklist. We  then
iscuss concrete examples from two recent studies intended to test
ual-systems models, as well as one of our own  previous studies,
ighlighting ways in which these studies were more or less pre-
ise and illustrating how being mindful of these suggestions may
mprove future research.
. Prediction
In many ways, one core goal of this commentary is to assert that,
n recognition of their broad accomplishments thus far, the mod-
ls presented in this issue – particularly the dual-systems model
f Shulman and colleagues (2016), as well as related models such
s imbalance (Casey, 2015) or triadic models (Ernst et al., 2006),
re ready to be challenged to make more precise predictions. In
ther words, we believe that there is sufﬁcient veriﬁcation in the
ublished literature to warrant a reorientation towards falsiﬁcation
n this subﬁeld; with respect to the social reorientation model of
elson and colleagues (2016), we suspect that the rapidly growing
esearch interest in this subﬁeld means a similar level of veriﬁca-
ion is not far behind. But in order for a theory to be falsiﬁable, it
eeds to make precise predictions. We  note that terms like imbal-
nce and mismatch are unfortunately quite imprecise in this regard,
equiring the null hypothesis to be that they are either precisely
atched or in balance during adolescence (which as Meehl (1978,
990a, 1990b, 1997) was fond of pointing out, is almost certainly
ever true), or that there is no difference in the degree of imbalance
r mismatch among children, adolescents and adults. Additionally,
he precision with which we deﬁne “adolescents” and the “vari-
ble” in question is also critical. In other words, even if individual
odels make directional predictions (as many do), this precision
requently gets lost in translation via imprecise deﬁnitions of ado-
escent development and/or neural mechanisms (as is discussed in
ore detail below).
Shulman and colleagues (2016) identify several reﬁnements of
he dual-systems model that we endorse, especially the prediction
hat social contexts (especially peer contexts) may  be signiﬁ-
ant moderators of many developmental effects. There are other
hanges to the models that we are concerned about, however. One
rend that has caught our attention is the gradual expansion of
onstructs and processes in one of the systems, without a similar
nclusivity with respect to neural circuitry. Early conceptualizations
f one system in these models focused primarily on motivational
rocesses like reward sensitivity, subserved by ventral striatum
Steinberg, 2008; Casey et al., 2008), despite frequent mention of
roader affective and emotional factors (but see the triadic model
or an approach that has always strongly differentiated these two;
rnst et al., 2006). As acknowledged by Shulman and colleagues
2016), there is now enhanced emphasis on the contributions of
ocial context and social cognition. But instead of considering how
his expands the relevant neural circuitry, which is signiﬁcantly
Blakemore, 2008) but not entirely (Nelson et al., 2016) distinct
rom the key regions and networks of interest in these models at
resent, these moderating and mediating processes are generally
ubsumed into a “socioemotional,” “affective,” or “motivational”
ystem. If we  are being precise about networks and processes, and
ant to be more precise in our predictions, we believe these con-
tructs should be unmerged. The original description of the social
nformation processing network (Nelson et al., 2005) attempted
o distinguish these constructs in some ways, but the updated
eview in this issue largely did not revisit what we  now know a
ecade later about the differential functions and relevant regions
r networks of interest. In our view, compelling models musttive Neuroscience 17 (2016) 131–137 133
differentiate among social, affective, and motivational factors (and
their sub-components) and associated neural networks, which each
are likely to have speciﬁc reciprocal relationships with the lat-
eral frontoparietal circuitry supporting cognitive functions such as
attention and control.
3. Experimental design
A second goal is to encourage us all to design stronger tests of
these more precise predictions. For example, with respect to dual-
systems and related models, if the literature indeed is converging to
suggest “a mid-adolescent peak in reward sensitivity, particularly
during reward receipt” (Shulman et al., p. 25), we should design
studies with the best chance of falsifying this reﬁned and more
precise prediction. In that case, we may  want to shift towards more
targeted samples that, instead of spanning the entire decade of ado-
lescence more or less evenly, emphasize and more carefully sample
around mid-adolescence (which highlights how carving up adoles-
cence into more precise and developmentally meaningful phases
is critical, to be discussed below). Ideally, we should also include
multiple assessments of neural and behavioral responses to reward
receipt and reward anticipation in the same study with the same
participants. Without careful planning, a given fMRI paradigm may
be ill-suited to assess both anticipation and receipt of reward, and
directly compare them, particularly in some forms of event-related
designs. Researchers may  plan studies that assess both constructs
equally well, or optimize different tasks and counterbalance the
order of administration in the scan protocol. Regardless of the
approach chosen, pitting the two directly against each other in
the same sample and not across studies would be a more “risky”
test of the reﬁned hypothesis put forth by Shulman and colleagues
(2016). A similar suggestion could be made with respect to social
reorientation model hypotheses. One strong prediction that can be
inferred from Nelson and colleagues (2016) is that neural responses
will be particularly attuned to social targets according to develop-
mental stage, and this could be tested with careful experimental
design both within stages (e.g., directly comparing adolescent reac-
tivity to mothers, peers, romantic partners) and across stages (e.g.,
assessing whether attunement to each stage-matched social target
is evident). However, we  suspect the former approach will be much
more tractable than the latter, at least in the near future.
An additional beneﬁt of the emphasis on precise experimental
design is the attention it draws to construct validity in our tasks.
What precise constructs or processes (e.g., neurocognitive, affec-
tive, interpersonal) do our tasks assess? For example, in a recent
systematic review of fMRI paradigms used to study reward in ado-
lescent versus adults, the authors concluded that the various tasks
produced mixed results and that it is “difﬁcult to clearly map  the
role of speciﬁc neural mechanisms onto. . . developmental changes”
(p. 988; Richards et al., 2013). Furthermore, they conclude that,
“we lack knowledge in the multiple ways that different variables,
including subject characteristics, experimental factors, and envi-
ronmental contexts, can inﬂuence the neural systems underlying
reward-related behavior” (p. 988). This is just one example of an
area where a variety of tasks that putatively tap into a coherent
underlying construct (i.e., functioning of the reward system) can
show strongly dissociated effects across different studies of that
construct. Indeed, rarely (if ever) are more than one of these tasks
used in a single neuroimaging study, so we actually have little infor-
mation on the degree to which performance on these tasks covaries.
Nevertheless, we often interpret these tasks as if they do all tap one
construct. This highlights the importance of very careful attention
to construct validity in our experimental tasks. In fact, it would
serve us well to return to the rich and venerable literature on con-
struct validity in the area of psychometrics. Cronbach and Meehl
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1955) originally presented the concept of a “nomological network”
s a method of evaluating the construct validity of psychological
ests, and proposed that in order to demonstrate that your measure
as construct validity researchers must develop a nomological net-
ork that consists of both a theoretical framework and an empirical
ramework regarding methods of measurement, and speciﬁcation
f the links among and between these two frameworks. Perhaps
ecause of the expense and complexity of neuroimaging compared
o psychometric measures, very few imaging tasks have been rig-
rously subjected to this kind of evaluation, and yet the absence of
uch an analysis can be a critical barrier to progress if studies that
re putatively investigating a particular construct are not in fact
oing so.
. Communication
Assuming we have been precise in our predictions and experi-
ental design, we might still stumble at the brink of success if we
re imprecise in communicating our ﬁndings. Below we identify
eeds for precision in two distinct communication streams.
The ﬁrst area of precise communication is internal to the
eld. Authors, reviewers, editors, and journals should provide and
emand much more precise reporting in papers, and a suite of asso-
iated practices which will facilitate cumulative progress. One step
n particular we now feel strongly about is the need to report main
ffects, by group, at the whole-brain level. It is particularly common
o focus on interactions (e.g., task versus control for adolescents
ersus adults), but that hampers our ability to combine informa-
ion across studies (e.g., in meta-analyses). For example, in the
ilverman et al. (2015) meta-analysis, 62 studies were identiﬁed
n a literature search addressing adolescent reward sensitivity, but
ccording to the methods only 26 could be included in the meta-
nalysis, and 21 were excluded speciﬁcally because the manuscript
id not provide sufﬁcient detail or relied solely upon ROI analysis.
We also feel that more precision in the labeling of regions is
ritical. For example, there are meaningful differences between
omponents of the basal ganglia – caudate, nucleus accumbens,
utamen – and the way in which we often confuse and/or equate
hese certainly undermines our precision. Other regions that are
ess well-deﬁned structurally, such as the temporal–parietal junc-
ion (TPJ), are sometimes labeled as such with too large a degree of
atitude, especially given that different subregions exhibit different
natomical and functional connectivity (for example with respect
o the TPJ, see Carter et al., 2012). Still other often-used regional
abels – chief among them “prefrontal cortex” – are so imprecise as
o be largely uninformative. Even simple lateral and medial distinc-
ions in PFC provide only a fraction more precision. In dual-systems
nd related models, we propose that a great deal more precision
ust be achieved especially with respect to subregions of the PFC.
n advance in the dual-systems review by Shulman and colleagues
2016) is its assignment of medial PFC and orbitofrontal cortex
ith the striatum to the “socioemotional system,” distinct from
ateral PFC, anterior cingulate cortex, and lateral parietal cortex
n the “control system.” However, this quickly becomes compli-
ated since ventromedial PFC has consistently been implicated in
egulation networks (Etkin et al., 2011), and dorsomedial PFC is
trongly associated with social cognition circuitry (Eickhoff et al.,
014; Bzdok et al., 2013). We  believe a key challenge for the devel-
pment of these models is not only to differentiate social cognitive
rocesses but also to meaningfully integrate them as a key feature
f adolescent development, especially in terms of their speciﬁc neu-
obiological substrates. This is an issue that Shulman and colleagues
o not address explicitly, although social cognitive processes and
etworks are clearly a central concern in the social reorientation
odel by Nelson and colleagues.tive Neuroscience 17 (2016) 131–137
Interrogating ROIs as the sole reported analytical approach can
be problematic even if deﬁned with a high degree of precision. A tar-
geted ROI analysis may  be seen to some extent as a more risky test of
one’s theory, presuming that one has speciﬁed directional effects.
However, this neglects the exponentially increasing emphasis in
the ﬁeld on networks and circuits (Pfeifer and Allen, 2012; Casey,
2015). Additionally, reporting only ROI analyses limits the contribu-
tion that rich whole-brain datasets may  provide, particularly when
combined with many other studies.
Some conservative data thresholding procedures bias us
towards detecting more circumscribed regions with high magni-
tudes. This is an important practice that supports making more
precise regional inferences, unlike the use of lower magnitude
thresholds that produce low spatial sensitivity (Woo  et al., 2014),
but there may  be reliable peaks at lower thresholds that will
only be identiﬁed using whole-brain big data approaches. Further-
more, inclusion of whole-brain data allows for direct comparison of
effects observed in predicted and non-predicted regions, once again
improving the testing of the speciﬁcity of the predicted effects.
Finally, we believe that we all could do more to ensure that con-
clusions are communicated accurately and with the right degree
of circumspection. This is true within our peer-reviewed papers, in
part to prevent misunderstandings for readers who do not have as
much “neuroimaging literacy”. It is perhaps even more true of, and
important to, our communications with the public through vari-
ous means (such as media interviews, popular press books, or blog
posts). Simply admitting that our models are “oversimpliﬁed” and
“heuristic devices” prior to describing an oversimpliﬁed heuristic
model is a great disservice, if that model is still likely to be taken
as a scientiﬁc fact by lay audiences despite such nuanced caveats.
It also undermines the reﬁnements that have evolved as further
studies reveal the need to modify theory.
5. Adolescence (developmentally meaningful indicators)
As noted several times above, general aspects of precision can be
especially complex in the ﬁeld due to our target population. Adoles-
cence is a particularly long phase of development, spanning nearly
a decade or more depending on whether one includes emerging
adulthood and how one deﬁnes pubertal onset. This is illustrated
by the fact that we  sometimes carve up adolescence into phases
(early, middle, late, and even pre; as noted by Shulman et al. on
pp. 7–8), but also often treat adolescence as if it is developmentally
homogeneous. For example, the recently released meta-analysis
on adolescent reward processing (Silverman et al., 2015) was  only
able to report that adolescents between 10 and 19 years of age
(mean age does not appear to be provided) exhibit greater acti-
vation during reward processing (collapsing across anticipation
versus receipt, and positive versus negative outcomes) than do
adults. Unfortunately, there is a lack of agreement in the ﬁeld about
the relevant demarcations across adolescence. In addition, even
when these phases are investigated more directly, we often slip
back into the shorthand of referring to “adolescents” in our conclu-
sions, abstracts, and other forms of communication.
Another issue is that chronological age is typically used to deﬁne
an adolescent’s developmental stage or maturation. However age
is always, at best, an imperfect measure of maturation, a fact that
has been recognized within developmental research for some time
(Wohlwill, 1970). This is especially true during adolescence, when
developmental processes such as puberty and physical maturation
can vary markedly between individuals of the same chronological
age – even more so than is typical at other stages of life (Mirwald
et al., 2002; Ellis, 2004). As the inﬂuence of pubertal development
wanes in middle to late adolescence, measures of biological pro-
cesses may  need to be supplemented with description of social
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ole transitions and other contextually meaningful sociocultural
ndicators of maturation (e.g., entering the workforce or higher edu-
ation, living independently, acquiring a driver’s license, forming
table long-term romantic relationships). Such individual varia-
ion in the timing and tempo of maturation is also likely to apply
o brain development itself. As such, in order to aid precision we
eed to develop ways of quantifying maturation that directly assess
eurodevelopment (e.g., Dosenbach et al., 2010, 2013).
There is an astounding lack of empirical detail about when
mbalances or mismatches are detected within this extended
evelopmental stage. As Shulman and colleagues note, extensive
ehavioral research provides a fairly strong expectation that the
opulation average peak response in ventral striatum – if indeed
t does represent a neural basis for sensation-seeking – should
all speciﬁcally around age 15 (Cauffman et al., 2010; Steinberg
t al., 2009). However, they conclude “the neuroimaging litera-
ure does not allow for a precise estimation of age of peak striatal
esponse” (p. 25). In fact, the ﬁeld likely does possess the data to
nswer this question, it just needs to be examined more precisely
nd collaboratively. For example, in parallel to the aforementioned
eta-analysis by Silverman et al. (2015), we have been working
n a different kind of quantitative meta-analysis of these studies.
 primary goal of ours has been to assemble the studies in a man-
er that allows us to actually ask when (chronologically, as we  do
ot have enough published studies assessing pubertal development
o ask the comparable question) across the decade of adolescence
his peak appears to occur (for more information, see http://dsn.
oregon.edu/research/arcs). This goal will only be achievable with
idespread participation across the ﬁeld in reporting and sharing
hole-brain group-level summary statistics (Poldrack and Yarkoni,
n press).
Another important issue is to contrast putative adolescent spe-
iﬁc phenomena with a wider range of alternative non-adolescent
evelopmental phases. In particular, studies that show differences
etween adolescent and adult groups often conclude that the differ-
nces must represent phenomena that are speciﬁc to adolescence,
nd then seek to explain these phenomena in terms of adolescent-
mergent or adolescent-speciﬁc neurodevelopmental processes.
ut the comparison with pre-adolescent child groups is less often
ade, and when it is made, does not always conﬁrm the conclu-
ion of adolescent speciﬁcity. For example, an important recent
eta-analysis of risky decision-making tasks across development
ound evidence for greater risk-taking in adolescents versus adults,
ut not adolescents versus children (Defoe et al., 2015). Data like
hese need to be addressed by models that presume increased risky
ecision-making is an adolescent-speciﬁc phenomenon.
. Neural inferences
One area where precision is of concern across the cognitive
eurosciences is in the speciﬁcity of our neural inferences. As we
reviously suggested (Pfeifer and Allen, 2012), and as nicely sum-
arized by Casey (2015) when considering several models related
o dual-systems: “new ﬁndings have moved the ﬁeld away from
implistic one-to-one mappings of the ventral striatum and amyg-
ala to reward and avoidant behaviors, toward the recognition of
istinct computational roles they each play in learning that inﬂu-
nce adaptive action in response to both positive and negative
utcomes” (p. 299). Here Casey (2015) is identifying the prob-
em of one-to-many and many-to-one (or many-to-many) relations
n neuropsychological inference. This issue has been extensively
xplored by Cacioppo and Tassinary (1990) with respect to an
llied problem – psychophysiological inference. They argue that
he strongest form of inference is associated with being able
o achieve a one-to-one mapping between the psychologicaltive Neuroscience 17 (2016) 131–137 135
construct of interest and the physiological process being measured
– however, such strong inferences are the exception rather than the
rule. For example, many psychological states can be associated with
increased amygdala activity (fear, pleasure, surprise, uncertainty),
and moreover, a given psychological state, such as depression, can
be associated with changes in multiple brain regions (e.g., amyg-
dala, hippocampus, subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)).
However, if we  want to use a neurobiological marker (e.g., activ-
ity in the nucleus accumbens) to infer a psychological state (e.g.,
reward anticipation) then we  need to work towards as close to a
one-to-one mapping between these domains as we can achieve.
(This of course is not to suggest that a single psychological function
is ever likely to be purely associated with the activity of a single
brain region in terms of a comprehensive model of the neurobi-
ological substrate of that function. Rather, the strongest regional
neuropsychological inferences will be possible when activity in the
region is a highly sensitive and speciﬁc marker of the psychological
processes of interest.) Developmental questions also dictate that
we map  patterns of change in neurobiological systems to patterns
of change in behavior across time, further specifying the nature
of the one-to-one mapping needed for strong neuropsychological
inference.
Cacioppo and Tassinary (1990) do propose a number of
approaches to the issue, many of which are applicable to devel-
opmental neuroscience. For example they suggest that researchers
redeﬁne what constitutes an element – i.e., the psychological or
neurodevelopmental variable of interest. In developmental neuro-
science this will probably entail moving from regional to network
based analyses and/or incorporating “form” (i.e., conﬁgural or tem-
poral information) into our deﬁnition of critical dependent and
independent neurobiological variables. In other words, we need to
enhance the precision of our variables such that there is stronger
hypothesized speciﬁcity (e.g., refrain from talking about PFC as if it
is functionally homogeneous), and move away from many-to-one
and many-to-many relationships that only support weaker infer-
ences, by precisely characterizing circuits and networks (spatially,
temporally, developmentally). In particular we  should relinquish
our reliance on single ROIs (both structurally and functionally)
given the low likelihood that the activity or volume of a given
structure will map  onto a behavioral phenotype in a one-to-one
way. Furthermore, we still only poorly understand the relation-
ship between brain structure and brain function, and should be
very careful to avoid assuming that the patterns observed will be
equivalent.
7. Signiﬁcance (ecological and/or translational outcomes)
Perhaps the most important issue with respect to the translation
of our science is to ensure that we are also measuring the ultimate
ecological outcome of interest (i.e., that thing that can answer the
“Who cares?” or “Why should we spend public money on this?”
questions). If you think the processes you are studying are impli-
cated in mental health, then measure mental health. If you think
they are relevant to risk taking, measure real life risk taking. If you
think they can affect academic performance, measure academic
performance. This is a question of the ultimate construct validity
of our work. For example, in a recent review of the neuroscience
of adolescent decision making Hartley and Somerville (2015) note
that “many tasks employed in neuroeconomic studies fail to cap-
ture key qualitative features of naturalistic choice contexts, which
may  diminish their validity for understanding real-world decision-
making” (p. 109). In other words, in some cases we may  be spending
a lot of time, energy, and money studying the neurodevelopmental
correlates of laboratory tasks that may  have little or no relation-
ship to phenomena of actual interest if we  don’t actually take that
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ritical step and measure the relationship between our labora-
ory measures and ecologically important, real world behaviors. In
evelopmental science, these processes also need to be measured
cross development, in order to ensure that when we  think devel-
pmental change in a neural or laboratory measure of interest maps
n to developmental change in an ecological variable of interest, it
oes so.
. Using the PECANS checklist
In this section, we brieﬂy consider three studies using the
ECANS checklist – one of our own, and two additional recent stud-
es from other labs, spanning three different methodologies (fMRI,
MRI, and rs-fcMRI). It should be noted that we hold these latter
wo studies in very high esteem, and in no way should our dis-
ussion of them be construed as a negative assessment of their
ontribution to the literature. In fact, we think these latter two stud-
es provide some exceptional examples of precision in prediction,
xperimental design, communication, adolescent development,
eural inferences, and signiﬁcant outcomes, and as such reveal the
trengths of research that ticks many boxes on the PECANS check-
ist. We  also subject our own work to scrutiny, as well as explore
heirs, for ways in which the studies could have been more precise.
Several years ago (Pfeifer et al., 2011), one of us (JHP) examined
ongitudinal change in reactivity to emotional facial expressions
uring the transition from late childhood to early adolescence.
he study took a relatively precise look at a speciﬁc period of
dolescent development, facilitated by the narrow range of ages
ested (9.5–10.6 and 12.5–13.6 years at waves one and two, respec-
ively). Yet even more developmental precision could have been
ossible in that domain by examining puberty instead of chrono-
ogical age (see Moore et al., 2012, for a complementary analysis
f these data taking just such an approach). The study also aimed
o link neural changes over three years within subjects to sig-
iﬁcant outcomes, namely changes in self-reported resistance to
eer inﬂuence and risky behavior, although real-world measure-
ent of these constructs would have provided even more precision.
ome aspects of experimental design were a “mixed bag”, as the
aradigm selected (passive viewing of emotions) was arguably bet-
er optimized to assess functional changes in the amygdala than the
entral striatum. The precision of neural inferences was bolstered
y functional connectivity analyses to assess whether responses
n ventral striatum were down-regulating the amygdala, but these
esults were not especially robust. Finally, although the study con-
ucted and reported whole-brain analyses, more precision could
ave been achieved with respect to communication, as whole-brain
esults from each wave of the longitudinal study were not reported
ndependently.
An exciting recent structural MRI  paper (Mills et al., 2014) tested
or the mismatch proposed by dual-systems models in another lon-
itudinal dataset where each participant contributed a minimum of
 datapoints over 10–20 years. The predictions were quite precise
nd risky, namely that subcortical structures involved in processing
ffect or reward would develop earlier than cortical structures
nvolved in cognitive control, and the degree of mismatch would
elate to risky behavior. However, because this was  a secondary
ata analysis in which signiﬁcant outcomes were assessed retro-
pectively, the experimental design did not allow for strong tests
f the relationship between structural mismatch and risky behav-
or, as acknowledged by the authors. Communication of results
as extremely thorough, including multiple visualizations of both
roup and individual level data. But the structural deﬁnition of PFC
as less precise, limiting neural inferences and communication
as acknowledged by the authors). More precise communication
ay  also have been achieved in the abstract of this study, in thattive Neuroscience 17 (2016) 131–137
there was  considerably more evidence of structural mismatch with
respect to amygdala and PFC (26/33 individuals) than nucleus
accumbens and PFC (17/33 individuals), and the authors state in
their discussion that the group level data did not provide evidence
of a clear structural mismatch between the nucleus accumbens
and PFC during adolescence, but the abstract stated “the majority
of individuals in our sample showed relatively earlier maturation
in the amygdala and/or nucleus accumbens compared to the PFC,
providing evidence for a mismatch in the timing of structural mat-
uration between these structures” (p. 147).
Finally, an impressive recent cross-sectional study of 269 8–25
year-olds (van Duijvenvoorde et al., in press) explored resting-state
functional connectivity patterns from the perspective of dual-
systems models. The authors selected a more precise dorsolateral
PFC seed ROI based on an fMRI task of cognitive feedback-learning
collected concurrently (although the affective reward-processing
task presumably intended to deﬁne nucleus accumbens resulted in
too widespread activation, so it was deﬁned structurally). They also
complemented this seed-based approach with data-driven inde-
pendent components analysis to identify whole-brain networks.
Their predictions were directional, which provided some precision,
but in the case of whole-brain analysis of functional connectivity
this was  relatively underspeciﬁed (as any brain region whatsoever
could have provided the increasing intrinsic connectivity with dor-
solateral PFC, or adolescent-speciﬁc pattern of connectivity with
the nucleus accumbens). An even more precise and risky predic-
tion might specify age (or puberty) related changes in connectivity
directly between dorsolateral PFC and nucleus accumbens, but
no such relationship was  hypothesized or observed. Although the
reporting was generally exceptionally comprehensive, even more
precision could be achieved in some communicative respects, such
as the labeling of a subgenual ACC/posterior medial OFC region
(acknowledged as such in the table) as ventromedial PFC through-
out the text; in our opinion, a more precise structural label and
deﬁnition is always preferable to a less precise one. The authors
found that linear increases between dorsolateral PFC and thalamus
mediated age-related changes in a meaningful adaptive outcome
(learning rate), but perhaps more conservative assessment of these
results with respect to their consistency with dual-systems models
is warranted, given the historical lack of attention to the thala-
mus  in these approaches. We  also found the adolescent-speciﬁc
peak in intrinsic functional connectivity within a cognitive-control
network from the data-driven ICA approach, as well as the lack
of an adolescent-speciﬁc peak in intrinsic functional connectiv-
ity with nucleus accumbens (largely monotonic increases were
observed, except with hippocampus), both intriguing and unex-
pected if one took a traditional dual-systems model perspective.
Indeed, the authors note that their hypotheses were deductions
from dual-systems models, which have not previously made spe-
ciﬁc predictions about resting-state functional connectivity.
We consider these latter two  studies to be outstanding exem-
plars of research that is raising the standards in terms of
operationalizing and testing models and adolescent neurodevel-
opment. The PECANS checklist helps to clarify the speciﬁc ways
in which studies like these are moving the ﬁeld forward. However,
the PECANS checklist can also be used to identify those areas where
even high quality studies can do a better job of providing the pre-
cision required for strong inferences and impactful translational
outcomes.
9. ConclusionThe origin of the word pecan traces back to an Algonquin word
referring to “nuts that require a stone to crack.” But hammering
away at a pecan shell with a blunt, round, heavy stone mainly
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esults in squashing the nut. We  need thin, sharp stones – pre-
ise tools for extracting the meat of the nut. To further advance
ur science of adolescent development, which to this point has
igniﬁcantly beneﬁted from the seminal dual-systems and social
eorientation models (Shulman et al., 2016; Nelson et al., 2016),
e propose that “audacious speciﬁcity” as concretized by the
ECANS checklist will help us all work together to conduct even
ore cumulatively meaningful work. Ideally, the PECANS checklist
ould be consulted prior to initiating a study, allowing researchers
o enhance precision from the outset, as well as revisited dur-
ng data analysis and communication phases. We  may be nuts (or
ust naïve), but it is our sincere hope that providing the PECANS
nemonic as a concrete, guiding rubric will facilitate more precise
nd “risky” research that can reﬁne our models and enable trans-
ormative translational work to improve and protect adolescents
s they develop.
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